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Summary findings
In the United States, gross business investments in plant  If the results from cross-section regressions can be
and equipment (fixed investments) constitute only about  viewed as representing the long-term equilibrium, the
10 percent of GNP, but such investments may represent  single most important determinant of capital spending
GNP's most important  component  because (1) plant and  appears to be cash flow.
equipment have a long-term effect on the economy's  Apparently, managers care more about cash flow and
productive capacity, (2) changes in investment spending  cost of capital than about stock market signals and the
directly affect levels of employment and workers'  level of output. And at the firm level, managerial
incomes in durable goods industries, and (3) supply and  perceptions about fundamentals are more important than
demand are sensitive to changes in investment, which is  market perceptions. For managers, the stock market may
the most volatile component  of GNP.  be a side show to capital spending decisions.
Economists have long been concerned about what - To generalize in a way that might be useful for
in the economy, the industry, and the firm - determines  developing countries: Financial decisions at the firm level
investments in capital spending. Using a panel of data for  are closely linked to real decisions in the economy.
U.S. manufacturing firms for 1972-90,  Samuel compares  Internal finance is the most important source of funds,
five theories of investment: accelerator theory, cash flow  and capital spending is the most important use of funds,
theory (liquidity model, managerial model, and  so there is a close relationship betwen real and financial
information-theoretic  model), neoclassical theory,  decisions.
modified neoclassical (Bischoff) theory, and Q theory.
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Even though business expenditures  on plant and equipment  gross investment  (business
fixed investment)  in the United States constitute  only about 10% of GNP, it is still perhaps the
most important component of GNP because: (i) plant and equipment are durable goods and
therefore variations in investment  expenditures  have long-term  consequences  for the economy's
productive capacity; (ii) investment expenditures affect demands for  the  products of  the
construction and  producer's  durable goods  industries. Therefore, changes in  investment
expenditures  lead to shifts in the aggregate  levels of employment  and personal income through
both direct and indirect effects; and (iii) since investment  is the most volatile component  of
GNP, aggregate  supply and demand are very sensitive  to changes in investment.
Given these considerations,  economists  have been concerned with the analysis of the
determinants of  investment (capital) expenditures for a  long time. This  analysis has been
conducted at all levels of disaggregation  viz. economy, industry, and the firm.  This paper
compares the alternative  theories of investment  using a panel of  U.S. manufacturing  firms for
the 1972-1990  period.
The study is organized into four sections.  Section I begins with a discussion of the
alternative  models of investment, then examines  the empirical evidence  for these models, and
considers the policy implications  of the different  models.  Section  II reports the results of the
time-series  regressions. Section  III has results from cross-section  regressions. Section  IV deals
with fixed effects  models. The final section  concludes  the study and discusses  the implications
for developing  countries.
1I
Models of investment
Broadly speaking,  one can distinguish  at least five theories of investment:  (i) accelerator
theory; (ii) cash flow theory; (iii) neoclassical  theory; (iv) modified neoclassical (Bischoff)
theory;  and (v) Q theory.' Within the rubric of the cash flow theory, there are three variants:
(a) liquidity model; (b) managerial  model; and (c) information-theoretic  model.
For analytical  purposes, the alternative  theories of investment  can be classified  in various
ways. One division could be based on the optimal adjustment  path for the firm's capital stock.
While the accelerator, neoclassical, modified neoclassical, and the cash flow models do not
explicitly  consider the optimal adjustment  path for the firm's capital stock when it is away from
that level, the Q theory characterizes the complete evolution of the capital stock from the
underlying  optimization  problem. 2 This therefore  provides  a rationale  for expectational  lags and
leaves room for lags in delivery  and installation  only.
Another  way to think about the different models  of investment  is to highlight  the factors
that underlay  the marginal returns to investment  and the marginal  cost of finance  in the different
models. For instance, a sharp distinction  can be drawn  between the managerial  and neoclassical
theories of investment  (Grabowski  and Mueller (1972)). In the neoclassical  theory, internal  and
external finance are  perfect  substitutes, following Modigliani-Miller(1956)  theorems, and
therefore  the marginal cost of finance  equals the shareholder's  opportunity  cost of capital. In the
managerial  theory of investment  however, managers  prefer to use internal funds since they are
I See  Appendix  I for a description  of these  models.
2 This  feature  is also  present  in the irreversibility  models. See  Dixit  and  Pindyck  (1994)  for a more
detailed  discussion  of irreversibility  models.
2the most accessible  part of the capital market and hence most malleable  to managerial  desires
for growth. The marginal cost of capital is significantly  lower for internal finance compared to
external finance, and therefore not equal to the shareholder's opportunity  cost of capital, but
some much  lower totally subjective  value set by the managers. In equilibrium,  marginal  returns
to investment  equal the marginal cost of finance.
The alternative models of investment can also be classified in terms of the relative
importance  of price variables like taxes and interest rates, quantity variables like output and
liquidity, and autonomous  shocks like "animal spirits" and technology  shocks as determinants
of capital expenditures (Chirinko (1993)). For the neoclassical model, only price variables
matter; for the accelerator and cash flow models, only quantity variables matter. For the Q
theory, what is relevant is autonomous  shocks, and for the modified  neoclassical  model, what
matters is a combination  of price and quantity  variables, with the latter being somewhat  more
important.
These five basic models of investment  are useful for a relative ranking of the various
factors (output, cash flows, cost of capital, prices, technology  shocks  etc.) that are important  in
shaping investment decisions.  In addition to these five models that emphasize the role of a
single factor to the exclusion  of all others in the determination  of investment  expenditures,  one
can think of at least two  other composite  models  that are combinations  of these  basic models  that
emphasize a  number of  factors:  (i) accelerator-cash  flow; and  (ii) Q-cash flow. 3 These
composite formulations are  essentially a  recognition of  the complexities involved in  the
I Even the Bischoff  (1971)  model  can be viewed  as a composite  model, i.e., the neoclassical-
accelerator  model.
3investment  process, the attempt  being to capture the multitude  of constraints that are operative
with regard to capital expenditure  decisions.
Like many other topics in economics,  research on investment  demand has been through
its share of cycles over time.  Thus, the early writers of the subject  emphasized  the accelerator
approach (Clark (1917), Chenery (1952), Koyck  (1954)  and others).  The original  contribution
of Clark (1917) was in fact part of an overall explanation  for business cycles.
The next theory of  investment to  emerge was the  liquidity (residual funds) theory
(Dusenberry  (1958), Meyer  and Kuh (1957),  Kuh (1963), Meyer  and Glauber  (1964), and Meyer
and Strong (1990)). According  to the liquidity theory, investment  depends primarily on cash
flows/internal finance--the sum of  retained earnings and  depreciation.  In  other  words,
investment may be constrained  by the supply of internal funds. Past levels of profits may also
be an adequate proxy for future levels and hence might be relevant for capital expenditures
decisions.
In part, the liquidity theory can be viewed as an attempt to explain the existence of
financing hierarchy, which constitutes one of the most well-documented  facts of corporate
finance (Koch (1943), Donaldson (1961)), wherein  the firm's preferred ordering of the sources
of finance is: (1) internal finance; (2) external debt; and (3) new equity. In fact, Donaldson
(1961) found that firms sold cash and investments (marketable securities) before taking on
external debt.
In the meantime,  Grunfeld  (1960)  proposed  the use of the firm's market value as a proxy
for expected profitability.  Therefore, investment  depends on the market value of the firm. In a
4way, the market value approach  of Grunfeld can be viewed  as a sort of a precursor to Tobin's
Q theory.
Then came along the neoclassical model  formulation  by Jorgensen (1963, 1966, 1967,
1971) and associates, in the wake  of the Modigliani-Miller  (1958) theorems. The neoclassical
model of investment  implies that investment  decisions  depend mainly upon the cost of capital,
and that the real and financial  decisions  undertaken  by the firm are separate. The departure of
the Jorgensonian approach was also in providing a structural formulation  of the investment
decision, based on profit maximizing  behavior by firms.  The earlier approaches lacked an
explicit theoretical  basis and were even deemed  ad hoc at one level.
About the same time, in a series of studies, Eisner and associates (1963, 1964, 1967,
1969, 1970, 1978) revived the accelerator approach, adding profits as well to the investment
equation. Therefore, it is probably more accurate to  characterize the Eisner model as the
accelerator-profits  model. Without surprise, a serious debate emerged between Jorgensen and
Eisner regarding the relative merits of neoclassical and accelerator models of investment.
Professional  economic journals of the late 1960s and the early 1970s are littered with these
debates.
The Q theory of investment, due to Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969), was
in sharp contrast to the output-oriented  models discussed above in that it attempted to explain
investment  on a financial  basis in terms of portfolio  balance, i.e.,  based on the q ratio--the  ratio
of the market value of capital to its replacement  cost. If managers  seek to maximize  the market
value of firms, they will add to their capital stock whenever  the marginal  addition to the firm's
market value exceed the replacement  cost of the capital stock.
5Bischoff  (1971)  proposed  an important  extension  to the standard  Jorgensonian  neoclassical
model with the putty-clay  approach. i.e.,  Bischoff  (1971)  pointed out that it is often easier to
modify factor proportions and thus the capital-output  ratio ex ante; ex post, the substitution
between  factors is zero. Consequently,  investment  may  be more responsive  to changes in output
compared to changes in the cost of capital. In other words, the distributed  lag of investment  on
changes in the relative prices of capital services has a different shape from the distributed lag
of investment on changes in output. In the literature, this model is known as the modified
neoclassical  model.
In a broad sense, the managerial  and the information-theoretic  approaches  to investment,
that are currently in vogue, can be viewed as modem versions of the liquidity theory.  Both
approaches  emphasize  the role of internal finance  as the fundamental  determinant  of investment
decisions. i.e., Both theories predict a positive relationship  between  cash flows  and investment.
In the information-theoretic  view, internal  and external  finance  are not substitutes  because
of information  asymmetries  between insiders and outsiders.  In the managerial  view, internal
finance  is preferred since it facilitates  discretionary  behavior  by managers  that may  run counter
to the interests of the shareholders.  Managers may pursue goals that are separate from the
welfare maximization  of shareholders, either through the pursuit of growth maximization  or
through the excessive  consumption  of perquisites. 4
In a chronological  sense, the managerial  approach  to investment  predates the information-
theoretic  approach. While the managerial  theory of the firm is due to Marris (1963, 1964), the
'  See Samuel  (1996a)  for a more  detailed  discussion  of the managerial  and information-theoretic
approaches.  The  original  thesis  of separation  of ownership  and  control  (management)  is due  to Berle  and
Means  (1932).
6formal modelling  and testing of the managerial  theory of investment  came with Grabowski  and
Mueller (1972).  The information-theoretic  approach to investment is really an off-shoot of
Akerloff's (1970) paper on the market for lemons.  Akerloff  (1970) showed  that information
asymmetries could interfere with the normal functioning  of markets and could lead to their
breakdown. The problems could be particularly  acute in some markets.
Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981)  and Myers and Majluff  (1984)  proposed  important  applications
of the lemons framework to  the study of equity and loan markets.  They pointed out that
information asymmetries could also lead to credit rationing and explain the existence of the
financing hierarchy.  In fact, Greenwald et al. (1984) argued that under conditions of credit
rationing, it is the availability  of capital  rather than the cost of capital  that matters for investment
decisions.
As far as composite  models  go, the accelerator-profit  (cash  flow) model is due to Eisner
(1978) and others. In the Eisner model, gross capital expenditures is a  function of sales,
depreciation, and profits.  Eisner (1978) argued that the rate of expected output should be the
primary determinant of investment. In practice, this translates to formulating  investment  as a
distributed lag function of current and past changes in sales. Other forces influencing the
expected profitability of investment is captured in current and past profits, which may also
capture some capital supply effects. i.e., To the extent that capital markets are imperfect, firms
tend to invest more when profits are high and less when profits are low.
In the empirical literature, the Q-cash flow model has been motivated  by at least two
strands of research: (i) the information-theoretic  approach to the study of investment  (Fazzari
7et al. (1988)); and (ii) the study of managerial perception  versus market valuation factors in
investment  decisions (Blanchard  et al. (1993), Rhee and Rhee(1991)).
Fazzari et al. (1988) estimate a reduced form investment  equation with cash flows and
the q ratio as the independent  variables. One criticism against this reduced form approach has
been that cash flows may proxy investment  demand even  if the q-ratio, the supposed  proxy for
investment demand, is included in the regression. Poterba (1988), for instance, notes that if
measured (average) q is a poor proxy for the true marginal q, it could be that cash flows and
true (marginal)  q are also correlated. This could also lead to simultaneity  bias in the estimation
process.
Blanchard  et al. (1993)  consider the role of the stock market as a signal to managers  with
regard to investment decisions. The issue here is whether managers take cognisance of the
signals given by the stock market or by the q ratio, while undertaking capital expenditure
decisions, even if the market valuation  does not match their own valuations  or perceptions of
fundamentals. 5
In any case, from a purely statistical/econometric  point of view, the composite  models
can be expected to perform better than the basic models  in that the former regressions include
more independent  variables. However, the empirical  evidence  presented  in this paper is limited
to the five basic models of investment  discussed above.
Empirical evidence
The validity  of any model  of investment  is ultimately  judged by its ability to explain  past
data as well to make future predictions. In two separate  studies,  Jorgensen and Siebert (1968a,
5 See  Samuel  (1996b)  for a detailed  discussion  and empirical  evidence.
81968b) carried out detailed empirical testing of competing models--accelerator,  neoclassical,
liquidity, and market value--at the firm-level  and found the neoclassical  model to be the best.
The Jorgensen and Siebert sample consisted  of fifteen large manufacturing  firms for the 1949-
1963 period.6
However, Elliott (1973) re-estimated the models of the original Jorgensen sample and
cane  to quite different  conclusions.  Elliott's sample  consisted of 184 firms for the 1947-1963
period. In cross-section  estimates,  cash flow  model  was found to be the best, while in time-series
estimates, the accelerator model  was better than all others. In general, Elliott's results nullified
Jorgensen's results for the neoclassical  model and confirmed  the need to have a more eclectic
framework  towards understanding  investment  decisions  by firms.
As  noted  earlier,  Eisner's  studies  consistently indicated the  superiority of  the
accelerator/accelerator-cash  flow models compared to the neoclassical model of investment.
Grabowski  and Mueller (1972) carried out a testing of the managerial  and stockholder  welfare
(neoclassical)  models of firm expenditures  using data for 66 firms for the 1959-1966  period.
Their empirical results indicated  the managerial  variant of the model to be far superior to the
stockholder  welfare maximization  version.
From this point onwards, almost all the testing of alternative  models  of investment  that
has been undertaken  in the literature has been confined  to the level of the aggregate  economy.
One addition to the research agenda has been the estimation of separate models for structures
and equipment. In particular, there has been  an emphasis  on understanding  the role of tax policy
6See  Jorgensen  (1971)  for a survey  of other  studies  of investment  up to the 1970s.
9in influencing  overall investment  expenditures  as well as its composition  between  equipment  and
structures.
For instance, Bischoff (1971) compared the alternative models of investment for the
1953-1968 period using quarterly data for the  U.S.  economy; separate regressions were
estimated  for equipment  and structures. In the case of both equipment  and structures  investment,
the modified  neoclassical  model was found to be the best, followed  by the accelerator model.
Clark (1979)  also undertook  an investigation  of the alternative  investment  models  for the
1954-1973  period using quarterly data for the U.S. economy, with separate regressions for
equipment  and structures. Like the results obtained  by Bischoff  (1971), Clark found modified
neoclassical model followed  by the accelerator model to be the best for structures as well as
equipment.  Clark therefore  concluded  that output was the primary determinant  of non-residential
fixed  investment  in the economy; variables  like the rental price of capital services, interest rates,
and tax rates proved to be not very helpful.
Likewise,  Bernanke  et al. (1988) carried out non-nested  specification  tests of time-series
investment  models  at the level of the economy; separate  equations  were estimated  for equipment
and structures  using quarterly  U.S. data for the 1955-1983  period. 7 The conventional  goodness-
of-fit statistics indicated that no one model of investment uniformly outperformed all other
models. Of the four models, the accelerator  and the modified  neoclassical  model were found to
be the best models  for equipment  investment.  In the case of structures  investment, Q model  was
found to be the best. However, when non-nested  tests that takes into account serial correlation
7 One difference  between  the specifications  in Bernanke  et al. (1988)  and those  of Bischoff  (1971)
and Clarke (1979)  was that Bernanke  et al. (1988)  tested only four models: (i) accelerator;  (ii)
neoclassical;  (iii)  modified  neoclassical;  and  (iv) Q.  Somewhat  surprisingly,  they  did not test the cash
flow  model.
10in the residuals were performed, the Q model was found to be the best. Also, detailed Monte
Carlo evaluations  did not turn up any conclusive  evidence for any of the competing  models of
investment.
Empirical testing  of the information-theoretic  approach  to investment  began with Fazzari
and  Athey (1987) and Fazzari et al.  (1988). This also marked the  revival of panel data
econometrics to the study of investment  decisions.1 The information-theoretic  approach has
really blossomed since then. 9
What is interesting  to note from this discussion is that there has not been any comparison
of alternative  models of investment  based on firm-level  data after Elliott's study in 1973. Even
in the studies done at the economy-level  after 1973, the pure cash flow model has not been
tested.'°  On both these counts, this paper differs from the rest of the literature. The choice of
the  firm as  the  unit of  analysis is  also  appropriate, given that investment decisions are
fundamentally  made at the firm-level. More generally,  this approach  is also consistent  with the
view in the literature that sees the world as a collection  of firms."'
It is also somewhat  ironic that even after Kuh (1963) demonstrated  the appropriateness
of the fixed effects approach to the estimation of investment  regressions in panel data, it was
largely ignored.  For instance, Jorgensen and Siebert (1968a, 1968b) largely concentrated  on
I As noted by Hsiao (1986),  Kuh (1963)  can be regarded  as the seminal  work in panel data
econometrics.
I See for exanple  the collection  of papers  in Hubbard  (ed.) (1990). See also  Hoshi  et al. (1991),
Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1993),  and  others.
10 While  Bischoff  (1971)  and Clark (1979)  tested  the cash flow-accelerator  model,  Bernanke  et al.
(1988)  did not include  the cash  flow  model  in any  fbrm at all.
" See  Mueller  (1993)  for instance.
11time-series procedures, believing that the  time-structure of investment is the key element.
Likewise, Elliott (1973) focussed  on cross-section  results." 2
Policy implications
A proper understanding of the determinants of investment is also crucial from the
perspective of economic policy. In  what follows, the policy implications of the alternative
models of investment  are discussed  briefly.
Since the neoclassical theory of investment regards the cost of capital as the most
important determinant, its principal policy recommendation  is in terms of tax measures that
would lower  the cost of capital and therefore  stimulate  investment."3  On the other hand, the cash
flow theories of investment  argue that what matters for investment  is the availability  of capital
rather than the cost of capital. However, the policy implications  of two of the variants of the
cash flow theory, the managerial  and information-theoretic  approaches, are quite different.
As noted before,  the information-theoretic  approach,  like the neoclassical  theory,  is based
on the assumption of profit-maximizing  behavior by firms. In the information-theoretic  view,
firms are credit-constrained  only because of the asymmetry  of information  between managers
and outside  suppliers  of finance.  The information-theoretic  approach  therefore implies  that funds
aix.  invested at rates of return above the shareholder  opportunity  cost of capital.
On the other hand, managerial  theory of investment  argues that mangers prefer to use
intemal finance due to considerations  of managerial  discretion. Overinvestment  of the firm's
12 The  time-series  approach  of Bischoff  (1971),  Clark  (1979),  and  Bernanke  et al. (1988)  are  perhaps
more  justified  since  they  use aggregate  rather  than  disaggregated  data.
'3 In fact  it is a common  practice to use tax-adjusted  user cost  of capital  in empirical  estimations  of
the neoclassical  model;  likewise,  tax-adjusted  q ratio is also  deployed  in estimating  the Q model.
12resources at rates of return below the shareholder's opportunity  cost of capital" 4 is a matter of
great concern in the managerial  theory of the firm. In particular, overinvestment  by old, mature
firms could displace  investment  by young, dynamic  firms at or above the market discount rate.
Therefore, the attendant  resource allocation  may not be optimal  from the point of view of social
welfare."5
Another implication  of the cash flow theories of investment  is that since investment  is
positively  related  to internal  finance,  the severity  of recessions  could get exacerbated.  Therefore,
countercyclical  policies may be helpful. Tax policy also plays a part in the cash flow theories
of investment  in that they can change the amount of internal finance available  firms.
The accelerator theory of investment is  basically driven by demand considerations
wherein investment  depends on the level of output. Therefore, fiscal and monetary policies
aimed at a steady increase in output could have a positive  effect on investment.
The Q theory of investment  also implies significant  role for tax policy in influencing
investment  decisions  through  modifying  the q ratio and strengthening  its positive relationship  to
investment.  Summers (1981) has shown  the importance  of the announcement  and timing effects
of tax changes  on investment  using the Q-theoretic  framework.  While  increases  in the investment
14  See Mueller  and Reardon  (1993)  for recent evidence.  Brainard  et al. (1980)  also found that
substantial  volume  of investment  in the U.S. economy  had  been  undertaken  below  the opportunity  cost
of capital,  which  is inconsistent  with  the predictions  of the neoclassical  theory.
" As noted  by Friedman  and Laibson  (1989),  a corporation  that is largely  dependent  on internal
finance  is not totally  insulated  from the judgement  of the stock  market. The market  still prices the
company's  shares,  and shareholders  seeking  improved  returns  may  exert  some  influence  on the firm's
management.  In addition,  if the market  places  too low  a value  on the firm's shares,  it could  become  a
target for take-overs. However,  there are well-known inefficiencies  in the corporate  governance
mechanisms  and  the market  for corporate  control.
13tax credit or accelerated  depreciation  stimulate  investment,  the effects  of those increases  depend
critically on the timing of the announcement  and its enactment.
Given these policy implications,  it is indeed important to have a proper understanding
of the determinants  of capital  expenditures,  especially  at the firm-level  where these decisions  are
ultimately made. This is  the primary objective of  this study and forms the basis for the
comparison  of the alternative models of investment.
Data and variables
The objective  of this paper therefore is to compare the competing  models of investment
using panel data.  In particular, one could question the premise of some recent research that
argues that the Q-theoretic  approach  is the best way to think about investment  decisions." 6 This
study goes back one step, and re-examines  the competing  theories of investment  using firm-level
data.  In that sense, this paper is very similar in spirit to that of Kuh (1963), Jorgenson  and
Siebert (1968a, 1968b), and Elliott (1973), albeit with a bigger sample and for a later time-
period.  This  study is  based on the capital expenditure decisions of a panel of 331 U.S.
manufacturing  firms, taken from Standard  and Poor's COMPUSTAT  database  for the 1972-1990
period.  As noted before, this is the first comparison  of alternative  models of investment  after
1973 using firm-level  data.
In estimating  the neoclassical  and Bischoff  models,  two measures  of the opportunity  cost
of capital--used  in turn for computing  the user cost of capital--have  been used in this paper.  In
time-series regressions, the real rate of interest--the nominal  rate less inflation--is  used as the
16 Chirinko  (1993)  provides  a comprehensive  survey  of the current  state  of research  on investment
theory,  with  particular  emphasis  on Q-theoretic  models.
14opportunity cost of capital.  In cross-section regressions, the opportunity cost of capital is
proxied  by the rate of return on firms belonging  to similar risk-classes, following  the procedure
outlined in Grabowski and Mueller (1972).'7  The q ratio has been computed following the
procedure in Salinger and Summers (1983).
II
Time-series  estimates (Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
Traditionally,  time-series regression estimates  have been viewed as reflecting short-run
reactions. For each firm, regressions  are run for each model for the 1972-1990  period.  Then,
a relative ranking of the models for each firm is done, based on adjusted r2, F-ratio, and the
standard error of the regression.  The estimation has been done in first differences  so as to
correct for serial correlation.  All the variables have been adjusted for inflation.
Regressions  without lagged variables
It may be noted that for the cash flow and Q models, data is available  for 18 years; for
the accelerator, neoclassical,  and Bischoff  models, it is 16 years.  These different time periods
are due to the differences in the specifications  of the models.  For the neoclassical and the
Bischoff  models, the opportunity  cost of capital was proxied by the real rate of interest.
" For each firm, the market rate of return--dividend  plus capital gains-is  computed  for each year
during the 1972-90  period.  Next, firms are ranked based on the variance  in these returns and grouped
into risk classes consisting  of the contiguous  30 firms.  The average  rate of return of the 30 stocks in
each sample firm's risk class is used as the estimate of the firm's opportunity cost of capital.  See
Grabowski  and Mueller (1972) for more details.
15For the whole sample  of 331 firms, the rakng  of models is as follows: (1) neoclassical
model; (2) Bischoff  model; (3) cash flow model; (4) acceleator model;1 and (5) Q model."
Nedt, each of the models was examined  in deail across firms.
(a) Aceltor  model: Out of the 331 regssions,  there were only 70(21%) with significant
F-ratios.  Within here, the parametes were significant(5%  level or better) in all 70 cases, and
the signs were correct for 69 firms.
(b) Neocla  model:  129(31%) out of the 331 regressions had significant  F-ratios.  The
pameters  were significant  in  102 cases. The signs were cofrect in 100 of these regressions.
(c) Bischoffumodel:  63(19%)  out of the 331 regressions  had significant  F-ratios. The paramets
of  ineres  rat  to pW,Y,/cF,(say  bl)  and pNjY>,I/cq(say  b2).  Out of  the  63 significant
regessions,  both bl  and b2 were significant  in 31 cases, and were insignificant  in 6 cases.  In
18 instances, bI alone was significant,  and in 8 cases, b2 alone was significant. In the 18 cases
that bl  alone was significant, it had the correct signs (positive)  in 17 instances.  Likewise, in
the 8 cases  that b2 alone was significant,  the signs were correct in 4 cases and wrong in 4 cases.
Out of the 31 cases where both bl  and b2 were significant,  the signs were correct in 29 cases
and wrong in only two cases.
It should  be noted  that  evem  though  the change  in output  is theoretically  more  appropria tan  the
level  of outpt fr  the accelerator  model,  the  lattr fared  better  in empirical  specifications,  suggetn  that
businessmen  work  towards  a targeted  capital-output  ratio. This  result  is also  consistent  with  the findings
of Clark  (1979).
9Two  vemrions  of the Q  model  were  tred; one  with  capital  expenditures  (I)  as the  dependent  variable
and the other with the ratio of capital  expenditures  to the replacement  cost of capital  (MK)  as the
dependent  variable. The latter  fired better  in empirical  specifications  and  only these  results  are shown
here.
16(d) Cash flow model: 62(19%) of the 331 regressions  had significant  F-ratios. The parameters
were significant  in all of the 62 cases.  The signs were correct in 57 cases.
(e) Q model: Only 25(8%) of the 331 regressions  had significant  F-ratios. The parameters were
significant  in all the 25 cases.  The signs were correct in only 9 of these cases.
Based on these results, the ranking of the models now is: (1) neoclassical  model; (2)
accelerator model; (3) Bischoff  model; (4) cash flow model; and (5) Q model.  For the most
part, this ranking is similar to the earlier ranking, except that the accelerator model is now
ranked second (fourth earlier), and the Bischoff  model is ranked fourth (second  earlier).  This
ranking can be considered more meaningful than the earlier one in that it is based only on
regressions with significant  F-ratios.  The earlier procedure was much less stringent in that it
did not require the individual regressions to be significant  (in the F-ratio sense), and merely
focussed  on their relative ranking, based on adjusted r.  Therefore, the results based on time-
series regressions suggest that at the level of the firm, the primary determinant of capital
expenditures  is the cost of capital, based here on the real interest rate.  i.e.,  In the short-run,
the cost of capital is the most important determinant  of capital expenditures.
Regressions with lagged  variables
Quite clearly, one of the important determinants  that of capital expenditure  decisions  at
the firm-level  are the expectations  about the future.  Given the nature of the data, one cannot
capture these ex-ante elements.  The next best thing is to relate capital expenditures  in the
current period to variables  of the previous  periods. This can be done by running  regressions  that
include lagged  variables. The results presented  below are based on a one-period  lag (one year).
Lags of higher order were tried, but turned out to be insignificant.
17As before, the ranking of the competing  models has been done on the basis of adjusted
r2, F-ratio, and the standard error of the regression.  For the total sample of 331 firms, the
ranking is as follows: (1) neoclassical;  (2) cash flow; (3) Bischoff;  (4) accelerator; and (5) Q.
Next, each of these models was examined  in detail across firms.
(a) Accelerator model: With the addition of lagged values, 78 regressions (compared  to 70
before) are now significant,  indicating  an overall improvement. i.e.,  Adding lagged values of
changes in output increases the explanatory  power of the model.  Out of these 78 regressions,
both the current and lagged  terms are significant  in 18 cases. Of these, the signs are correct in
16 cases.  In the case of the remaining regressions, the current term alone is significant  in 37
cases, and in 20 cases, the lagged  term alone is significant. There are 3 cases where neither the
current term nor the lagged terms are significant.  The signs are correct in almost all of the
regressions.
(b) Neoclassical model: The addition of the lagged term brings about a minor decline in the
number of significant  regressions from 102 to 93.  In other words, the addition of the lagged
term is not important  for the neoclassical  model. Out of the 93 regressions,  both the current and
lagged terms are significant  in 29 cases.  In the case of the remaining  regressions, the current
term alone is significant  in 51 cases, and the lagged  term alone is significant  in 9 cases.  There
are 4 cases where both the current term and the lagged terms are not significant  at all.  This
result also implies that lagged terms are not important  for the neoclassical  model.  This in tum
suggests  speedy adjustment  by firms to changes  in cost of capital  while undertaking  investment.
The signs are also correct in most instances.
18(c) Bischoff  model: With the addition of lagged variables, 76 regressions have significant  F-
ratios, compared to 63 before.  As discussed  before, the parameters of interest with regard to
the Bischoff  model are the ones associated  with p,.1 Y,/c  ,-(say  bl) and p,1Y 1.J/c,  .(say b2).  As in
the case of the regression  without the lagged  term, the b2 term has the correct, negative  sign in
most of the cases.  For instance, in the 2 cases that the current term alone is significant, it is
negative in 1 case; out of the 34 cases that the lagged  term alone is significant,  it is negative  in
30 instances.  In the 14 regressions  that the current and lagged terms for b2 is significant,  the
signs are correct in 12 cases. Therefore, the addition  of lagged  terms renders more regressions
significant  and therefore strengthens the case for the Bischoff  model.
(d) Cash flow model: Addition of lagged  variables improves  the performance  of the cash flow
model as well.  There are  now 69 regressions with significant F-ratios, compared to  62
previously.  In 16 cases, both the current and lagged terms are significant. In 28 cases, the
current term alone is significant,  while the lagged term alone is significant  in the remaining  23
cases.  The signs are also correct in almost all the instances.
(e) Q model: Like all other models  (except  the neoclassical  model), additional  lagged  variables
improve the performance  somewhat. The number  of significant  regressions  rises to 46 from 25
before. There are 12 cases where both current and lagged  terms are significant;  in 13 instances,
current term alone is significant  and in 20 cases, the lagged  term alone is significant. When the
signs of the coefficients  are examined, the picture is similar.  In the 20 times that the lagged
term alone is significant,  the signs are correct 15 times. Likewise, out of the 13 times that both
current and lagged terms are significant,  the signs are correct in 10 instances. In the 12 cases
that both the current and the lagged  terms are significant,  the signs of both terms are correct in
19only 2 cases.  In 9 cases, the current term has the wrong sign, while the lagged term has the
correct sign.  In the remaining  one instance, the current term has the right sign and the lagged
term the wrong sign.  The importance  of the lagged q ratio clearly underscores the forward-
looking aspect of the q ratios, guided  by the stock market, in influencing  investment  decisions.
On the basis of these results, the ranking  of models is: (1) neoclassical;  (2) accelerator;
(3) Bischoff; (4) cash flow; and (5) Q.  With the exception  of the neoclassical  model, lagged
variables improve the fit of the regressions in all cases.  This certainly makes intuitive sense
since the past levels of  output, cash flows, and the q  ratio are  expected to be important
determinants  of the capital  expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level. It is also interesting to note
that the finding  with regard to the superiority  of the neoclassical  model  in time-series  regressions
is consistent with that of Jorgenson  and Siebert (1968a, 1968b).
Cross-section estimates (Tables 8, 9,  10, 11, 12)
In  the literature, cross-section regressions are  viewed as  more nearly representing
adjusted long-run equilibrium.  Cross-section  regressions were run for the 1972-1990  period.
For each of these years, the regression models  were estimated  across firms and then the models
were ranked for each year based  on adjusted  r2, standard  error of the regression, and the F-ratio.
Given the way that the models are formulated, only the cash flow and Q models have
been estimated for 1972, and all the five models for the years from 1974 to  1990.  All the
variables have been deflated  by total assets to adjust for heteroscadasticity.
When the models are judged on the basis of the F-ratio, all the models turn out to be
significant,  possibly due to the large sample size (N=331).  The ranking of the models based
20on adjusted r,  F-ratio, and the standard error of the regression is as follows: (1) cash flow; (2)
Bischoff; (3) neoclassical;  (4) accelerator; and (5) Q.
Next, these regressions were analyzed  in detail in terms of the significance  and signs of
coefficients. In the case of the cash flow and Q models, the coefficients  are significant  and have
the correct signs in all the cases.  In the case of the accelerator model, the coefficients  are
significant  in 12 out of the 17 cases. Out of these 12 cases, the signs are correct in 9 instances.
In the case of the neoclassical  model, the coefficients  are significant  in 16 of the 17 cases.  The
signs are correct in 13 of these 17 cases. In the case of the Bischoff  model, there are only eight
instances  where the parameters associated  with both pA  Yt/c  ,(say bl) and p,1,Yt_ 1 /c, 1(say b2) are
significant. In all these eight instances, both bl  and b2 have the right signs.  In the remaining
nine cases, only bl  is significant  and the signs are correct in all the nine cases.
Therefore, the revised ranking of the models is: (1) cash flow; (2) neoclassical; (3)
accelerator; (4) Q; and (5) Bischoff. It is interesting  to note that the finding  with regard to the
superiority of the cash flow model  in cross-section  regressions is consistent with that of Elliott
(1973).
IV
Fixed effects estimates (Tables 13, 14.  15, 16, 17, 18, 19)
Fixed effects model  procedures  are designed  to take advantage  of the panel nature of the
data explicitly. They are useful in eliminating the idiosyncratic  differences  across firms with
regard to investment  expenditures,  i.e., differences  that cannot  be captured adequately  by other
independent variables.  The primary objective of fixed effects estimation is to control for
characteristics  that are specific  to the firm but invariant  over time, over and above  elements that
21are captured through other independent  variables.  In other words, fixed effects procedures
reduce the omitted variable bias.
In the literature, fixed effects are also termed as individual time-invariant  and period
individual-invariant  variables. 20 The individual  time-invariant  variables  are variables  that are the
same for a given cross-sectional  unit (firm)  through time, but vary across cross-sectional  units.
Examples  include firm-management,  ability,  sex, and socioeconomic  background  variables. The
period individual-invariant  variables are variables that are the same for all cross-sectional  units
at a given point in time, but vary through time.  Examples include prices, interest rates, and
business confidence.
As first step, a pooled  Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression  can be run based on the
model
yit =  a  +  (SXi  +  u 1t  (1)
Then, a fixed effects  model can be done
Yit=  -i  +  (Xit +  Uit  (2)
where a; captures the effects  that are specific  to the firm.  Once the two models  are estimated,
an F-test can be done for testing whether aj==a or not; i.e.,  whether fixed firm effects are
important  or not.
Broadly speaking,  there are two equivalent  approaches  to estimate equation  (2): (i) OLS
with firm-specific  dummies; and (ii) OLS based on deviations  from means (for each firm, the
mean over time is computed and the deviation  taken from this mean). This estimate is known
as the Least Squares Dummy  Variable (LSDV)  estimate, or the within-group  estimate. This is
m See  Hsiao (1986)  for a more  detailed  discussion.
22also the time-series  estimate, since it only exploits  the variation  across years. 2'  The analysis  can
be enriched by controlling for year-specific  characteristics  by inserting  year dummies, either in
conjunction  with firm-specific  effects  or alone. In what follows, both of these approaches  have
been carried out.
Fixed versus  Random  effects:  The next issue to consider is fixed versus random effects. One
way to think about the difference  between fixed and random effects is to view the former as
applying  only to the cross-sectional  units (firms) in the study, and not to additional  ones outside
the sample. Random  effects,  or the error components  model, is more appropriate  if the sampled
cross-sectional  units are drawn from a larger population. 22
In the context of this study, it would seem therefore that the random effects estimation
may be more appropriate.  A general model would  be
Yit  = c  +  3Xjt  +  ui +e  i,  (3)
While a, is fixed  in the fixed  effect  estimation,  it is random (ot+uj) in the random  effects  model.
Consequently,  the random effects model has to be estimated using Generalized Least Squares
(GLS).  The Hausman test (1978) has also been used to see if fixed or random effects is more
appropriate for the data.
Tables 13 to  19 show the results of the estimation of fixed effects and random effects
models.  Model (1) incorporates  both firm effects and year effects.  Model (2) has only firm
effects, and no year effects; model (3) has only year effects, and no firm effects.  Therefore,
21  It  should  be noted  that  while  (i) and  (ii) are equivalent  in terms  of parameter  estimates,  it is not
so with  regard  to  r2. Estimation  under  (ii)  leads  to much  lower  r2 compared  to (i). This is because  the
deviations  from  means  procedure  reduces  the  model  variation(sum  of squares).  This  paper  uses  approach
(i).
2  See  Greene  (1994)  for a more  detailed  discussion.
23models (1), (2), and (3) represent  within group estimates  of the fixed effects  model. Model (4)
has no firm effects and no  year effects, and is  simply the  OLS estimate for the  pooled
regression.  Between  group estimates  are shown next.  GLS(1) and GLS(2) are random effects
estimates; while GLS(1) includes year effects, GLS(2) does not have year effects.  Model (5)
is a regression  with only the firm effects  on the right hand side. Model (6) is a regression with
only the year effects  on the right hand side.
Following  the practice in the literature, F-ratios have been computed to make inferences
from the various models presented.  Following  Hsiao (1986), model (1) can be viewed as the
unrestricted model, and models  (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6) as restricted models; in practice, the
significance  of the particular restriction in question is tested for.  This is another way to get at
the importance  of firm-specific  and year-specific  effects.
It is interesting to start the discussion  of the results with models  (5), and (6).  As noted
before, model (5) is a regression  with only firm dummies  on the right hand side and model (6)
has only year dummies. These models attempt to answer the following  question.  If only the
identities  (names)  of the firms and time-periods  (years) were known,  how much  of the variation
in capital expenditures  could be explained?. The surprising result is that firm effects  matter a
lot, while year effects alone are not so important.  For instance, in the case of the model with
(I/K) and firm dummies, r9 is 0.49.  Not surprisingly,  this level of explanation(value  of r)  is
not exceeded  by any of the models that do not involve  fixed firm effects.
Accelerator model (Table 13)
While year effects  together with firm effects  turn out to be significant,  year effects  alone
are not significant. Comparison  of models  (4) and (1) clearly  shows  the improvement  in brought
24about by the addition of fixed firm and year effects; r2 increases from 0.73 to 0.89.  Given that
year effects  are not significant,  it is no surprise that the parameter  estimates  from model (1) and
model (2) are similar, as are the estimates  from models  (3), (4), and the between  group model.
The r2 values for the GLS models  are significantly  lower than those for other models. In fact,
the results from the Hausman test (based on models (1) and GLS(1)) categorically  reject the
random effects model.
Neoclassical  model I, I  (Tables 14, 15)
The basic result is that year effects  and firm effects  are important, separately  as well as
together.  Again, the improvement in the fit of the regression is considerably better with the
addition of fixed firm effects, compared to fixed  year effects. When the Hausman test is done,
the  null hypothesis cannot be  rejected implying that the  random effects model is  more
appropriate for the neoclassical  model.
Bischoff  model I, II (Tables 16, 17)
The results support the Bischoff  model, especially  the version that uses real interest rate
as the opportunity  cost of capital. This makes intuitive sense, since the within-group  estimates
are based on the time-series dimension  of the data.  When the Hausman test is done, the null
hypothesis  cannot be rejected implying that the random effects model is more appropriate for
the neoclassical  model.
Cash flow model (Table 18)
The basic result is that year effects  and firm effects  are important, separately  as well as
together.  However,  year effects  are only weakly important, since the improvement  in the fit of
the regression is significantly  better with the addition of fixed firm effects, compared to fixed
25year effects.  When the Hausman test is done, the null hypothesis  is rejected and therefore the
fixed effects model can be accepted  as being more appropriate for the cash flow model.
Q model (Table 19)
Again, year effects  and firm effects are important, separately  as well as together.  The
fit of the regression improves significantly  with the addition of fixed firm effects, compared to
fixed  year effects. When the Hausman test is done, the null hypothesis  is rejected and therefore
the fixed effects model can be accepted  as being more appropriate for the Q model.
The ranking of the models  based on the above  regressions  is: (1) cash flow; (2) Bischoff;
(3) neoclassical;  (4) accelerator; and (5) Q.
V
Conclusions  and discussion
The results of the study clearly support an eclectic approach to the study of capital
expenditure  decisions at the firm-level. 23 While the time-series  analysis ranks the neoclassical
model as the best, the cross-section regressions gives the No.  1 spot to the cash flow model
(Table 20).  Likewise, the fixed effects model regressions support the cash flow model and
emphasize  the prevalence  of firm-specific,  idiosyncratic  differences  regarding  capital  expenditure
decisions. This result can also be viewed  as vindicating  the choice of the firm as the basic unit
of analysis  in the study. As noted earlier, these findings  of the study are consistent  with earlier
evidence in the literature.  If  the results from cross-section regressions can be viewed as
m This is similar  to the result  of the pioneering  study  my  Meyer  and  Kuh  (1957)  who  fbund  that  the
investment  decision  is subject  to a multiplicity  of influences  and evidences  different  behavior  under
different  circumstances  and  time-periods.
26representing the  long-run  equilibrium, the  single-most important determinant of  capital
expenditures  appears to be cash flows.
These results based on the comparison  of alternative  models  of investment  are indicative
of the relative importance of the determinants of capital expenditures  at the firm-level. The
results suggest that managers  care more about cash flows and cost of capital than the level of
output and  stock market  signals (q  ratio).  In  other  words,  managerial perceptions of
fundamentals  facing  the firm are more important  than market perceptions  with regard to capital
expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level. 24
These results also suggest that contrary to the presumption  in the literature, the Q model
of  investment performs  the  worst  among competing models of  investment in  empirical
specifications,  even though it is superior  to other models  in terms of theoretical  elegance. This
finding regarding the poor empirical performance  of the Q model is consistent  with the results
of Bischoff  (1971), Clark (1979), and Bemanke et al. (1988) based on aggregate  data.
Given this overall lackluster  performance  of the Q model, it would seem that mangers
are not primarily guided by the stock market with regard to investment decisions.  In other
words, the stock market may be a sideshow  as far as capital expenditures  at the firm-level  are
concerned. Therefore, these models  are consistent  with the findings  of Morck et al. (1990)  and
Samuel (1996b) regarding the limited implications of stock market activity for the resource
allocation  process in the economy. This conclusion  then raises two  related issues: (i) if the stock
market is really a sideshow,  market volatility  may not really be an issue from the point of view
24 See Samuel  (1996b)  for a more detailed  analysis  of the relative  importance  of managerial  and
market  perceptions  with regard  to capital  expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level.  See  Blanchard  et al.
(1993)  for a similar  analysis  at the aggregate  level.
27of resource allocation  in the economy; and (ii) if the stock market is not important for the firm
with regard to the investment  decision, what are the other implications  of stock market activity
for the firm. 25
With regard to developing  countries, the testing  of investment  theories has been  confined
to accelerator, neoclassical, and cash flow theories of investment. 26 The application  of the Q
model  has been limited, given the rather exacting  data requirements  for the computation  of the
Q ratio, following  the methodology  outlined  in Salinger and Summers (1983). In particular, it
is difficult  to estimate the replacement  cost of the firm's capital stock precisely and one has to
use the book value instead.
These  results are  also  interesting in  the context of  ongoing economic reforms in
developing  countries.  Without doubt, increasing private investment  by providing appropriate
incentives  has been perhaps  the most critical challenge  for these reforming  countries  and having
a proper understanding  of the determinants  of capital  expenditures  is a crucial  component  of this
challenge.  This has become  especially  important for countries that are undertaking significant
privatization  of economic  activities  and are attempting  to reduce the role of the State  in economic
activities in general and the size of the public investment  program in particular.
In addition, the response  of investment--especially  private investment--to  macroeconomic
stabilization  in general and structural adjustment in particular has been an important issue of
'  Samuel  (1995)  provides  a detailed  analysis  of the financing  role of the stock  market  and Samuel
(1996c)  provides  a detailed  analysis  of the governance  role of the market.
'  Athey  and Laumas  (1994)  found  support  for the cash  flow  theory  of investment  for India.  Using
panel  data,  Harris  et  al. (1994)  and  Jaramillo  et al. (1993a,  1993b)  found  support  for  the cash  flow  theory
of investment  for Indonesia  and  Ecuador  respectively.  Likewise,  Nabi  (1989)  and  Tybout  (1983)  found
support  for the cash  flow  theory  for Pakistan  and  Colombia  respectively.  Also,  Bilsborrow  (1977)  found
support  for accelerator  and  cash  flow  theories  using  panel  data  for manufacturing  firms  in Colombia.
28debate.'  Research has suggested that investment  typically pauses in the wake of adjustment
lending and this pause has been attributed  to the overall uncertainty  that accompanies  adjustment
lending, which in turn has a negative effect on investment. 28 Therefore, over and above the
various factors highlighted  by the alternative  theories of investment  that was discussed earlier,
it is necessary to consider uncertainty as an additional factor in  the context of developing
countries undertaking economic reforms.  This  issue  has also become an important for
transitional  economies. 2 '
A proper appreciation  of the underlying factors  behind capital expenditure  decisions  at
the firm-level in the case of developing  countries has also become important  in the context of
the recent world-wide  interest in emerging markets.  Increasingly,  capital flows to developing
countries have become rapid, though transient at times, in the wake of the constant search for
unexploited  arbitrage opportunities  by global investors, especially institutional investors, on a
world-wide basis.  From the perspective of portfolio investment as  well as  foreign direct
investment,  a proper understanding  of the dynamics  of investment  and economic  growth in these
emerging markets is essential for sustaining  these flows for the long-term.
The results of the study also has some  interesting  methodological  and data-related  issues
for developing  countries.  As discussed earlier, this study has shown that the firm rather than
7  See Corbo  et al. (1992)  for a discussion  of issues  related  to structural  adjustment  and  adjustment
lending. Pritchett and Summers (1993)  also provide a recent overview  of the issues.
I  See Serven and Solimano (1994)  for a recent survey of evidence  regarding the negative effect  of
uncertainty  on investment. See Dixit and Pindyck  (1994)  for a more general treatment  of issues  relating
to uncertainty  and investment. See also, Chhibber et al. (1992), Bleaney and Greenaway  (1993), and
Branson and Jayarajah  (1995) for discussions  of the impact of adjustment  on investment.
2 See World Bank (1996)  for an interesting  review  of the evidence  relating  to transitional  economies.
29the industry or the economy  is the most appropriate unit of analysis for understanding  capital
expenditure  decisions  at the firm-level. In particular, panel data is most useful  for distinguishing
between alternative models of investment, since it controls for firm-specific  and time-specific
fixed effects. This in turn is a significant  challenge  for developing  countries, which  traditionally
have had poor database  infrastructure compared to developed  countries.
The  findings of  the  study also become interesting in  the  context of  the emerging
consensus in the economics profession on looking at economic theory as being capable of
explaining economic phenomenon on a global basis, rather than being compartmentalized  to
address the problems of developing  and developed  countries separately. 30 This is of course a
fundamental  departure from the earlier view in the profession  and strikes at the very root of a
discipline  such as development  economics. In the new perspective,  what distinguishes  countries
are the conduct  of economic  policies  rather than initial conditions  which formed  the basis for the
earlier notion of different theories being necessary to understand economic phenomenon in
developed  and developing  countries.  If one were to go by the emerging view, the findings of
this study with regard to the determinants  of capital expenditures  at the firm-level  for a panel
of U. S. manufacturing  firms could equally be applicable  to firms in developing  countries.
These findings regarding the relative importance of various factors that underpin the
alternative  theories of investment  are also related to the larger issue of the relationship  between
financial  and real factors in the economy. The evidence  presented in this paper regarding the
superiority of the cash flow theories of investment  in cross-section  and fixed effects  regressions
suggest that financial  decisions  are indeed closely  linked to real decisions  in the economy. This
30 See Agenor  and  Montiel  (1996)  for an interesting  exposition  of this view.
30finding  is consistent  with the evidence  from other studies  of sources and uses of funds for firms
that have shown internal finance to  be  the  most important source of  funds  and capital
expenditures  to be the most important use of funds and therefore a close relationship  between
real and financial  decisions. 3'
Last, but not least, a proper understanding  of the determinants  of capital  expenditures  at
the firm-level  is also crucial for policy making purposes in developing  countries. As discussed
earlier, the varying nature of policy implications  associated  with different models  of investment
implies that policy formulation has  to  be  closely grounded to  the  underlying theory of
investment. This becomes so much more critical, given the current emphasis  on reducing the
role of the State in economic  activity, in the overall context of economic  reforms in developing
countries, that was noted earlier.
3'  See  Samuel  (1995)  for instance.
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37Appendix  I
Investment  Models
(I)  Neoclassical  Model
It =  a  +  Efi 1 j(A(pY/c))t- 5+Ut
(II) Modified Neoclassical  (Bischoff)  Model
I  =  of +  saOl(pt-FlY.-1/ct-E,) +  E02.(Pt-Ilyt-ll/ct-ll)  +  Ut
(III) Accelerator Model
It  =  ci+  F-  1Yt  +  ut
(IV) Cash flow Model
I=  +  EOj5(CF),.  +  ut
(V) Q Model
Log(,/Kt) = a  +  EOl.Qt. +  ut
where I-real capital expenditures,  p-price of output, Y-quantity  of output, c-user
cost of capital (c=(r+d)pk,  r-opportunity  cost of capital, d-depreciation  rate, Pk-
investment  goods price index. Two measures of r have been used, viz. r, and r2;
r, follows the methodology  outlined in Grabowski and Mueller (1972), and r2 is
the real rate of interest. In cross-section  analysis, r, was used and in time-series
analysis,  r2 was  used.);  Y-level  of  output,  CF-cashflow  (net  income+
depreciation), Q-Tobin's q ratio, the ratio of market value of the firm to the
replacement value of  its  assets, based  on  the  methodology in  Salinger and
Summers (1983), and u, the standard error term.
Predictions:
In general, the parameters associated  with all the variables in the various models
are  expected to be  positive. However, for the Bischoff model, the parameter
associated  with the p,. 1Y., 1/ct-I term is expected to be negative.
38Table 1: Time-series estimates (N=331)
Number  of times  the ranks  is:
1__ _  1  12  3  4  5
_  1I  UlI  1I  11  I  II  I  II  I  1I
Accelerator  44  53  93  90  77  83  81  79  36  26
Neoclassical  126  106  48  55  57  70  54  58  46  42
Biscboff  67  64  80  83  51  48  31  36  102  100
Cashflow  65  66  64  58  66  69  84  90  52  48
Q  130  42  43  T45  79  61  8s  68  93  115
I-Regressions without lags.
fl-Regressions with lags.
39Table 2: Tlme-series estimates (without lags: N=331)
Number of tdas  the left hand side models is better than the right hand side model
L_______  |Accelerator  Neocassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
Accelerator T  130  187  163  201
Neoclassical  201  223  199  237
Bischoff  144  108  142  180
Cashflow  168  132  189  204
Q  130  94  151  127
Note: Based on the methodology  in Elliott (1973).
Table 3: Time-series estimates (with lags: N=331)
Number of thnes the left hand side models is better than the right hand side model
Accelerator  Neoclassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
Accelerator  ***  147  207  170  216
Neoclassical  184  216  189  239
Bischoff  124  115  139  185
Cashflow  161  142  192  211
Q  115  92  146  120  ***
Note: Based on the methodology  in Elliott (1973).
40Table 4: Tlme-sertes estimates (without lags: N=331)
Model diagnostics
|  Accelerator  Neoclassical  Cashflow  Q
F=0  261  129  269  306
F#0  70  102  62  25
Signiflcance  of
parameters*
t#O  70  102  62  25
t=o  0  0  0
Signs of
Parameters
Correct signs  69  100  57  9
Wrong signs  1  2  5  16
e  5% or better.
Table 5: Time-series estimates (without lags: N=331)
Model diagnostics: Bischoff  model
_____________  p,__  Y_  P,__y_  p,  YA/c. 1 &  p,  YJc,. 1
Significance  of
parameterse
t=O  8  18  6
t#O  18  8  31
Signs for significant
parameters
Correct signs  17  4  29
Wrong signs  1  4  2
* 5% or better.
F  ratio is significant  for 63 regressions
41Table 6: lime-series  estimates  (with lags: N=331)
Model diagnostics
Accelerator  Neoclasical  Cashflow  Q
F=0  253  238  262  285
F#0  78  93  69  46
Significance  I  n  III  II  III  I  II  III  I  II  III
of
parameters*
t=0  20  37  3  9  51  4  23  28  2  20  13  1
t#0  37  20  18  51  9  29  28  23  16  13  20  12
Signs of
Parameters
Correct signs  37  1  16  49  9  27  25  23  14  10  15  2
Wrong signs  0  1  **  2  0  __  3  0  *.  3  5  **
Current(Yes)  **  **  2  **  ..  2  **  *  2  **  **  1
,Lagged(No)  I  _  _
Current(No),  *s  **  0  **  0  **  **  0  **  **  9
Lagged(Yes)  _  ___
I-Current  term only  11-Lagged  term only  III-Current  term & Lagged  term
8  5% or better
42Table 7: Time-series estimates  (with  lags: N=331)
Model  diagnostics:  Bischoff model
Current term only  Lagged term only  Current  & Lagged
Significance  of  p, Yt/ct  l  Pt Yt. 1/ct-I  pl1y,/Ct- 1 p  t-,yt  1/ct-I  Pt-lYt/Ct-i  plYt- 1 l/c,-
parameters*  l
t=O  2  36  34  7  15  29
t#O  36  2  7  34  19  14
Signs  for parameters
Correct signs  36  1  6  30  19  12





5  5% or better
F-ratio is significant  for 76 regressions
43Table 8: Cross-Section estimates (N  19)
Ranking of models
Accelerator  Neoclassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
1972  L  1  2 
1973_  _  _  _  _  _  _1  2
1974  4  3  ~  ~~~~2  1  5
1975  5  _3  2  1  4
1976  3  4  2  1  5
1977  ;4  23  2  1  5
1978  3  4  2  1  5
1979  4  3  2  1  5
1980  5  4  2  1  3
1981  5  3  2  1  4
1982  5  4  2  1  3
1983  4  3  2  1  5
1984  4  3  2  1  5
1985  4  3  1  2  5
1986  3  4  1  2  5
1987  4  3  1  2  5
1988  4  3  1  2  5
1989  5  4  1  2  3
1990  5  4  1  2  3
44Table 9: Cross-section estimates (N  =19)
Number of times the rank is:
Accelerator  Neoclassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
1  0  0  6  13  0
2  0  0  11  6  2
3  3  10  0  0  4
4  8  7  0  0  2
5  6  0  0  0  11
Total  17  17  17  19  19
Table 10: Cross-section estimates (N= 19)
Number of times the left hand side models is better than the right hand side model
_________Accelerator  Neoclassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
Accelerator  ***  3  0  0  11
Neoclassical  14  _  **  _  O  |0  0  13
Bischoff  17  17  6  17
Cashfow  17  17  13  ***  19
IQ  6  4  0  0  ***
Note: Based on the methodology  in Elliott (1973).
45Table 11: Cross-Section  estimates
Model  diagnostics
Accelerator  Neoclassical  Cashflow  Q
N  17  17  19  19
F=O  0  0  0  0
F#O  17  17  19  19
Significance  of
parameters*
t#0  12  16  19  19
t=O  5  1  0  0
Signs of
Parameters
Correct signs  9  13  19  19
Wrong  signs  3_  3  0  0
*  5% or better
Table 12: Cross-Section estimates (N=17)
Model  diagnostics: Bischoff model
.___.  __P_  _lyt/Ci_  p,,,Y,,,/c,-  Pt  Iyt/Cpt 1 &PtIcyt  l/Ct 
Significance  of
parameters_
t=O  0  9  0
t#O  9  0  8
Signs for significant
parameters
Correct signs  9  8
Wrong signs  0  0
Note: F  ratio is significant  for all 17 regressions
5% or better
46Table 13: Accelerator model
AY  Firm  Year  R2  S.E.R.  F
effects  effects
Model(l)  0.055*  Yes  Yes  0.891  149.43  131.37*
l  _________  (37.31)
Model(2)  0.055*  Yes  No  0.890  149.82  137.26*
(38.77)  l
Model(3)  0.079*  No  Yes  0.735  226.03  916.32*
(128.15)
Model(4)  0.079*  No  No  0.734  226.12  1648.29*
__________  (128.29)  l
Between  0.080*  ***  ***  0.826  167.67  1563.61*
Group  (39.54)
GLS(1)  0.065*  ***  No  0.338  152.30  3046.54*
(55.20)
GLS(2)  0.065  ***  Yes  0.341  151.97  172.33*
l  __________  (54.24)  l
Model(5)  ***  Yes  No  0.859  166.91  109.96*
Model(6)  *  No  Yes  0.004  432.51  1.26
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses;  *  significant at 1% level; S.E.R.-Standard  Error of Regression
47Table 14: Neoclassical  model I
A(pL,Yt/c)  Firm  Year  S.E.R.  F
effects  effects  l
Model(1)  0.006*  Yes  Yes  0.867  166.98  98.94*
_ _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (14 .16 )_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Model(2)  0.005*  Yes  No  0.864  168.71  101.23*
_____  _____  (13.90)  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Model(3)  0.015*  No  Yes  0.043  434.19  14.72*
(15.23)  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _
Model(4)  0.014*  No  No  0.037  434.73  219.68*
_____  _____  (14.82)  _  _  _  _  _
Between  0.265*  ***  ***  0.523  277.38  362.58*
Group  (19.04)
GLS(l)  0.006*  No  0.033  177.46  190.87*
_____  _____  (13 .82 )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
GLS(2)  0.006*  l  Yes  0.049  175.92  18.17*
(14.07)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Table 15: Neoclassical  model  II
A(pIYJ/c  Firm  Year  R2  S.E.R.  F
effects  effects
Model(1)  0.063*  Yes  Yes  0.871  164.34  102.63
_____  _____  (19 .43)  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Model(2)  0.063*  Yes  No  0.868  165.85  105.30*
(19.60)  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
Model(3)  0.242*  No  Yes  0.164  405.83  64.56*
_____  _____  (32 .8 1)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Model(4)  0.238*  No  No  0.159  406.42  1061.90*
_____  ____  (32.59)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _
Between  1.272*  ***  ***  0.779  188.90  1162.20*
Group  (34.09)
GLS(1)  0.073*  ***  No  0.069  185.24  418.11*
_  _ _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (20 .45 )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
GLS(2)  0.073  *  Yes  0.081  184.02  30.25*
_____  ____  (20.32)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses;  * significant  at 1% level; S.E.R.-Standard  Error of Regression
Neoclassical  I uses  Grabowski-Mueller  (1972)  measure  of cost of capital; neoclassical  II uses the real rate
of interest as the cost of capital.
48Table 16: BJichoff model I
p ,Y,/c, 1 l  Pt 1Yt.-Ic,,  Firm  Year  R2  S.E.R.  F
effects  effects
Model(l)  0.008*  -0.006*  Yes  Yes  0.867  167.15  98.42*
(12.12)  (-8.85)
Model(2)  0.008*  -0.006*  Yes  No  0.863  168.92  100.63*
(11.95)  (-8.88)
Model(3)  0.017*  4.005*  No  Yes  0.586  285.56  440.88*
(14.38)  (-4.36)
Model(4)  0.017*  -0.005*  No  No  0.579  287.43  3872.08*
(14.65)  (4.13)
Between  0.025*  -0.013  ***  ***  0.705  217.98  395.91*
Group  (0.98)  (-0.49)
GLS(1)  0.011*  -0.006*  No  0.103  177.34  322.97*
(15.49)  (-8.20)
GLS(2)  0.011*  -0.006*  Yes  0.122  175.43  44.42*
(15.75)  (-8.21)
Table 17: Bischoff model II
Pm 1Yt/ct  1 Pp-Y,  J/c,  Firm  Year  R 2 S.E.R.  F
effects  effects
Model(1)  0.044*  -0.005**  Yes  Yes  0.884  155.93  115.35*
(14.74)  (-1.64)
Model(2)  0.043*  -0.003  Yes  No  0.883  156.43  120.00*
(14.61)  (-1.04)
Model(3)  0.064*  -0.002  No  Yes  0.743  225.06  899.81*
__________  (15.04)  (-0.54)  1
Model(4)  0.062*  -0.0004  No  No  0.742  225.17  8079.11  *
(14.79)  (-0.08)
Between  0.226**  -0.168  0.839  161.39  857.36*
Group  (2.23)  (-1.62)  _
GLS(1)  0.051  *  0.0003  ***  No  0.343  159.28  1470.12*
(17.14)  (0.09)  No  0.343  159.28  1470.12*
GLS(2)  0.053*  -0.002  Yes  0.346  158.93  166.35*
(17.42)  (-0.47)  _
Note: t-ttatisdcs are  in parentheces;  *  Significant  at 1  % level;  **  significant  at 5% level; S.E.R.-Stndard  Error  of RegreSaon
Bischoff I us  Grabowaki-Mueller (1972) maeeure  of cost of capital;  Biwchoff  n1  uses th  re  al rate of interest as  the cost of capital.
49Table 18: Cashfiow model
Cash flow  Firm effects  Year effects  R2 S.E.R.  F
Model(1)  0.380*  Yes  Yes  0.885  151.10  130.69*
(33.86)
Model(2)  0.389*  Yes  No  0.883  151.87  136.16*
(35.20)
Model(3)  0.708*  No  Yes  0.845  170.63  1797.64*
(184.42)
Model(4)  0.707*  No  No  0.844  171.17  33884.43*
(184.08)
Between  0.741*  ***  ***  0.975  63.86  12718.38*
Group  (112.78)
GLS(1)  0.649*  ***  No  0.653  185.24  418.11*
(108.73)  1  1  _
GLS(2)  0.650*  ***  Yes  0.655  160.17  629.71*
(108.63)  ___  ___
Table 19: Q model
Q  Firm effects  Year effects  R 2 S.E.R.  F
Model(1)  0.057*  Yes  Yes  0.517  0.52  18.  19*
j!  _____________ (11.41)
Model(2)  0.048*  Yes  No  0.502  0.52  18.17*
(10.14)
Model(3)  0.(117*  No  Yes  0.097  0.69  35.48*
(2  4  .2  6  )  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Model(4)  0.109*  No  No  0.078  0.70  530.17*
____________  (23.03)
Between  0.184*  ***  0.198  0.46  82.58*
Group  (9.09)
GLS(I)  0.056*  ***  No  0.022  0.53  142.05*
___________  (11.92)
GLS(2)  0.065*  ***  Yes  0.047  0.52  17.14*
(13.26)
Model(5)  ***  Yes  No  0.494  0.53  17.61*
Model(6)  _  No  Yes  0.012  0.72  4.34*
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses;  * significant  at 1  % level; S.E.R.-Standard  Error of Regression
50Table 20:Ranking  of Investment  models
Accelerator  Neoclassical  Bischoff  Cashflow  Q
Time-series  4  1  2  3  5
(no lags)  l
Time-series  4  1  3  2  5
(with lags)
Cross-  4  3  2  1  5
section




Between  4  3  2  1  5
group  l
Pooled  4  3  2  1  5
regressions  l_
GLS(with  5  3  2  1  4
year effects)  _
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